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CHINA-UNITED STATES TRADE 
NEGOTIATIONS AND DISPUTES: THE WTO 
AND BEYOND 
Pasha L. Hsieh∗ 
ABSTRACT 
China and the United States. It begins by ascertaining the unique 
political aspects of China-U.S. bilateral economic ties and explains 
the historical background underlying the relations. The article then 
argues that trade frictions between China and the United States are 
unlikely to repeat the Depression-era trade wars. The article 
observes that both the Chinese and U.S. governments are aware that 
the adoption of WTO-inconsistent measures may result in retaliatory 
actions from the other side. Hence, the two governments have 
attempted to resolve potential disputes through high-level official 
talks. Even when certain issues cannot be solved through dialogue, 
the WTO dispute settlement system has proven to be efficient as an 
instrument of final resort to deal with bilateral trade frictions. 
Finally, the article submits that the change in China’s attitude 
toward WTO disputes further integrates the country into the 
international economic order and paves the way for a more positive 
development of China-U.S. trade relations.  
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This article examines trade negotiationsand disputes between 
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The economic power of the United States is facing challenges due to 
the rise of the People’s Republic of China (P.R.C.). Since its economic 
reform in 1978, China’s economic scale and foreign trade have been 
growing at a substantial rate. The country is currently the world’s third 
largest economy, and its foreign exchange reserve of nearly USD 2 trillion 
is by far the world’s largest.1 China’s role on the global stage has grown to 
be even more significant amid the recent financial crisis. This is well 
demonstrated by the attention that China received at the recent G-20 
summit2 and by the country’s request for additional voting rights in the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF).3 It is widely acknowledged that with 
China’s rise, the bilateral relationship between the G2 – the United States 
and China – will be a crucial determinant of the world’s direction in the 
new century.  
Accordingly, it is important to understand China-U.S. trade relations 
and the impact of the two nations’ increasing interdependence on the globe. 
The existing literature, which rarely examines these issues, focuses mostly 
on the legal issues of bilateral trade litigation under the World Trade 
Organization (WTO).4 This article, instead, will explore the economic ties 
between China and the U.S. from a more holistic perspective, by providing 
a political and economic analysis of their trade relations and disputes under 
bilateral and multilateral frameworks. The article will also discuss the 
implications of China-U.S. WTO disputes and explain, in particular, their 
importance to the bilateral relationship.  
Some commentators surmise that the underlying reason for the 
proliferation of China-U.S. trade conflicts is the United States’ large trade 
deficit with China,5 which may in turn lead to a “trade war” between the 
                                                 
1
 Guy de Jonquières, China and the Global Economic Crisis, ECIPE POL’Y BRIEFS NO. 02/2009 
(Eur. Centre for Int’l Pol. Econ., Brussels, Belg.), Apr. 6, 2009, at 1; China’s Foreign Exchange 
Reserves, 1977-2008, http://www.chinability.com/Reserves.htm (last visited Sept. 17, 2009).  
2
 See generally China and the G20: Taking the Summit by Strategy, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 6, 2009, 
available at http://www.economist.com/displayStory.cfm?story_id=13447015 (last visited Sept. 
17, 2009). 
3
 Andrew Batson, China Seeks More Involvement – And More Clout, WALL ST. J., Mar. 31, 2009, 
at A10, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123837953546968375.html (last visited Sept. 
17, 2009) (describing that China wishes to provide more funding for the IMF in exchange of 
additional voting rights). 
4
 See, e.g., Stuart S. Malawer, United States-China Trade Litigation in the WTO, 56(5) VA. LAW 28, 
30 (2007), available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/articles/malawerchinalitigation.pdf (last 
visited Sept. 17, 2009); see generally Henry S. Gao, Taming the Dragon: China’s Experience in 
the WTO Dispute Settlement System, 34(4) LEGAL ISSUES OF ECON. INTEGRATION 369, 372-90 
(2007); see generally Glenda Mallon & John Whalley, China’s Post Accession WTO Stance (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. W10649, 2004), available at http:// 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=579796 (last visited Sept. 17, 2009). 
5
 See, e.g., Heather Stewart, U.S.-China Trade War Looms, THE OBSERVER, Mar. 26, 2006, at A1, 
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two nations. A trade war refers to an economic conflict between two 
countries, caused by the fact that one country has imposed trade 
restrictions against the other, prompting the latter to retaliate in a tit-for-tat 
fashion by imposing higher tariffs or non-tariff barriers. Trade wars, which 
spiraled into a vicious circle during the Great Depression, would lead to a 
deterioration of bilateral trade relations. This article will refute such a 
pessimistic assessment of China-U.S. trade relations, and argue instead 
that the increasing disputes between China and the U.S. should be seen as 
a positive development because it shows that the two sides are working to 
reduce trade frictions through a legalized framework. In addition, China’s 
launching of WTO disputes against the U.S. also demonstrates a shift in 
China’s attitude toward the WTO dispute settlement system. This new 
mindset not only further integrates China into the global economic order, 
but also increases the WTO’s legitimacy. 
This article will proceed in the following sections. In Section II, I will 
provide an overview of China-U.S. trade relations and identify the unique 
aspects of that relationship. In Section III, I will explore the structure of 
trade monitoring mechanisms under domestic U.S. and Chinese laws and 
the WTO framework, and discuss how bilateral and multilateral trade 
dialogues have worked in practice. I will propose that these mechanisms 
and dialogues have diminished potential trade frictions between China and 
the United States. In Section IV, I will examine the role of the WTO 
dispute settlement mechanism in solving China-U.S. trade disputes. In this 
respect, I will analyze the respective litigation patterns of Washington and 
Beijing, as well as the implications of those legal actions. Finally, I will 
provide a conclusion on how my analyses above substantiate my 
propositions.  
II. CHINA-UNITED STATES TRADE RELATIONS: THE HISTORICAL 
AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND 
Trade relationship between China and the United States has been 
uneasy and politically sensitive. Part of this can be attributed back to how 
the Chinese were first exposed to the concept of “free trade.” Following its 
defeat in the Opium War, China in 1842 concluded the Treaty of Nanjing 
with the United Kingdom,6 under which the United Kingdom imposed a 
                                                                                                           
available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/money/2006/mar/26/business.china (last visited Sept. 17, 
2009); Antoaneta Bezlova, China: Headed for Trade Wars with U.S., INTER PRESS SERVICE, Apr. 
27, 2007, http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=37521 (last visited Sept. 17, 2009); See generally 
Economist Foresees U.S. Trade Sanctions Against China, CHINA DAILY, July 4, 2007, available at 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2007-07/04/content_909975.htm (last visited Sept. 17, 
2009). 
6
 History: East Meets West, http://www.gio.gov.tw/taiwan-website/5-gp/yearbook/2001/chpt04- 
1.htm (last visited Sept. 17, 2009). For the text of the Treaty of Nanjing, see USC-UCLA Joint 




unilateral most-favored nation (MFN) clause on China and gained 
possession of Hong Kong. This treaty marked the beginning of a series of 
“unequal treaties” between China and Western powers and heralded 
China’s “century of humiliation” at the hands of imperialism.7 In 1844, 
following the U.K. example, the United States forced China to sign the 
Treaty of Wangxia, which accorded the U.S. the same trade privileges that 
Britain obtained.8 This was the first treaty between China and the United 
States.  
These unequal treaties, which introduced the Chinese to the West’s 
concepts of international law and “free trade”, degraded the country to a 
semi-colonial status. For this reason, Chinese intellectuals for decades 
were suspicious of the role of international law and perceived it as a rule 
that is “reasonable but not reliable.”9 Moreover, the sense of national 
humiliation brought upon by unequal treaties fuelled subsequent Chinese 
governments’ goal to abrogate them and restore China’s superpower status. 
This historical experience, to some extent, explains China’s attitude toward 
participating in international organizations, including the WTO.  
A. China’s Economic Reform and WTO Accession 
Although the Peoples’ Republic of China was established in 1949, 
official high-level contact between the P.R.C. and the U.S. did not begin 
until President Richard Nixon’s ice-breaking visit to China in 1972. The 
visit paved the way for the normalization of relations between the two 
nations, a process which culminated in the establishment of bilateral 
diplomatic ties in 1979. Trade was not of prime concern to either country 
at this time because Washington’s decision to recognize the P.R.C. was 
driven by a geopolitical strategy to align with China to counterbalance the 
Soviet Union and Beijing, for its part, intended to leverage the new 
relationship to assert its legitimacy as the sole government of China.  
China’s economic policy in the 1960s focused on the 
                                                                                                           
East Asian Studies Center, Treaty of Nanjing (Nanking), 1842, http://www.international.ucla.edu/e 
as/documents/nanjing.htm (last visited Sept. 17, 2009). 
7
 PEOPLE’S CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: A DOCUMENTARY STUDY, VOLUME 1, at 6 (Jerome 
Alan Cohen & Hundah Chiu eds., 1974) [hereinafter PEOPLE’S CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW]. 
See also David M. Lampton, The Faces of Chinese Power, 86(1) FOREIGN AFFAIRS 115, 117-18 
(2007), available at http://www.comw.org/cmp/fulltext/0701lampton.pdf (last visited Sept. 17, 
2009).  
8
 U.S. Dep’t of State, The Opening to China Part I: the First Opium War, the United States, and 
the Treaty of Wangxia, 1839-44, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/dwe/82011.htm (last visited 
Sept. 17, 2009). 
9
 PEOPLE’S CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 7, at 10. Japanese intellectuals in the 
Meiji era similarly stated that “[a] hundred volumes of international . . . are weaker than the barrel 
of the gun.” Id. For discussions on ancient China’s view on the relationship between China and the 
non-Chinese world, refer to Jacques deLisle, China’s Approach to International Law: A Historical 
Perspective, 94 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 267, 268-70 (2000). 
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inwardly-oriented goal of achieving self-reliance. Thus, the country had 
little interest in establishing economic ties with foreign states. Its economic 
isolation further worsened after Beijing severed its ties with the Soviet 
Union and most of the communist bloc due to ideological differences.10 
On the other hand, China’s trade with the U.S. took off after Nixon’s trip – 
bilateral trade volume rose from USD 5 million in 1971 to USD 800 
million in 1973.11 These numbers affirm the above description of the 
China-U.S. economic relationship as a “politically sensitive” one. Since 
1978, China has embraced Deng Xiaoping’s reform agenda, which was 
intended to replace the country’s Soviet-style central planning with a 
market economy and end China’s isolation. This decision was not simply 
an economic one, but symbolized a political and ideological turning point. 
Deng’s goal was to raise China’s living standards and to prevent the 
erosion of the Chinese Communist Party’s political legitimacy after ten 
years’ turmoil caused by the Cultural Revolution. Deng’s policy to create a 
“socialist market economy with Chinese characteristics” proved to be 
successful. The once “sleeping giant” is now awake, with its economic 
strength rising at a remarkable rate.  
There are salient political and economic reasons why China aspired to 
join the WTO.12 First, China’s initiation of the WTO application process 
signified Chinese leaders’ acceptance of, and commitment to, an 
outwardly-oriented economic policy. The Chinese elite were well aware 
that China’s accession to the WTO would ensure the fruits of the reform, 
as WTO membership would deepen China’s integration into the global 
economy and thus prevent the country from reverting back to isolation.13 
Second, WTO membership would adequately recognize China’s expanding 
economic role in the world and affirm, to some extent, that the country has 
ascended to the ranks of modern states on par with Western nations. Such 
an affirmation would do much to fulfill the nation’s superpower aspirations. 
Finally, from a more pragmatic perspective, WTO membership would be 
an efficient way to “delink” human rights issues from trade relations with 
the United States. From 1979 to 2002, under the Jackson-Vanik 
                                                 
10
 U.S. Dep’t of State, United States Relations with China: Separation and Reopening 
(1950-2001), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/pubs/fs/90835.htm (last visited Sept. 17, 2009). 
11
 Jiangyu Wang, The Evolution of China’s International Trade Policy: Development Through 
Protection and Liberalization, in ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT THROUGH WORLD TRADE: A 
DEVELOPING WORLD PERSPECTIVE 191, 194 (Yong-shik Lee ed., 2007). See also WAYNE M. 
MORRISON, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, CHINA-U.S. TRADE ISSUES 2, Order Code RL 33536 
(2008). 
12
 See generally Nicholas R. Lardy, Issues in China’s WTO Accession, http://www.brooki 
ngs.edu/testimony/2001/0509foreignpolicy_lardy.aspx (last visited Sept. 17, 2009); see also Pasha 
L. Hsieh, Facing China: Taiwan’s Status as a Separate Customs Territory in the World Trade 
Organization, 39(6) J. WORLD TRADE 1195, 1196-1203 (2005). 
13
 See also de Jonquières, supra note 1, at 4 (explaining China’s decision to join the WTO was “to 
tie its own hands and prevent backsliding on economic reforms”). 




Amendment of the Trade Act of 1974, China needed the U.S. president’s 
yearly waiver to obtain “normal trading relations” status, as the 
Amendment denied non-market economies MFN status subject to 
presidential waiver.14 Congressional efforts to overturn the amendment 
created a yearly debate on China, linking China’s trade status with its 
human rights records. As the Amendment would be inconsistent with the 
MFN principle at the core of the WTO, China’s WTO membership would 
thus guarantee its access to the U.S. market and save the Chinese 
government from the yearly embarrassment of having its human rights 
record publicly scrutinized.  
China’s participation in the WTO demonstrates the nation’s 
willingness to engage the global economic order and is consistent with the 
country’s foreign policy mantra of “peaceful rise”.15 To pursue economic 
development, China needs to safeguard its market access externally and 
maintain social stability internally. These considerations determine China’s 
attitude toward market concessions and trade disputes.16  
B. U.S. Trade Policy Toward China 
China’s accession to the WTO is also consistent with U.S. interests 
because it has been Washington’s goal to bring China into a rule-based 
international economic order. Hence, the United States consistently 
supported China’s WTO membership in spite of interruptions caused by 
political events such as the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989 and the 
NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999. After China 
joined the WTO in 2001, the China-U.S. trade relationship entered a new 
stage in which the U.S. objective was to monitor whether China met its 
WTO obligations. The United States did not initiate trade litigation against 
China at this stage because the U.S. intended to provide China some 
leeway to implement its overall WTO obligations. In the end, China in fact 
carried out its commitments, including substantially lowering its tariffs and 
                                                 
14
 For discussions on the Jackson-Vanik amendment, see generally VLADIMIR N. PREGELJ, CRS 
REPORT FOR CONGRESS, THE JACKSON-VANIK AMENDMENT: A SURVEY 6-9, Order Code 98-545 
(2005), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/98-545.pdf (last visited Sept. 17, 2009); 
WILLIAM H. COOPER, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, THE JACKSON-VANIK AMENDMENT AND 
CANDIDATE COUNTRIES FOR WTO ACCESSION: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 306, Order Code RS 22398 
(2006), available at http://www.us-asean.org/Vietnam/CRS_JacksonVanik.pdf (last visited Sept. 
17, 2009). 
15
 The goal of “peaceful rise” exhorts the country to pursue peaceful development instead of 
hegemony. Peaceful Rise: Strategic Choice for China http://www.china.org.cn/english/ 
features/93939.htm (last visited Sept. 17, 2009). 
16
 See Michael Overmyer, With China’s WTO Entry Requirements Winding Down, Will 2006 
Become China’s “Year of the Bank”?, THE CHINA BUS. REV., available at http:// 
www.chinabusinessreview.com/public/0601/overmyer.html (last visited Sept. 17, 2009) (“PRC 
trade officials also face pressure from domestic companies and their bureaucratic champions to 
limit the market access of foreign competitors.”). 
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opening its market,17 and U.S. exports to China increased dramatically.18 
As the deadline for China’s phase-in period to meet most of its WTO 
commitments passed in 2006, the China-U.S. trade relationship moved to 
the next stage.19 The U.S. now intends to tackle those “harder” obligations 
yet to be fulfilled by China. This gradually intensifying attitude is 
primarily driven by domestic groups and Congress, which deem America’s 
large trade deficit20 with China to be the result of Chinese “unfair trade 
practices”.  
Today, with the Democrats controlling both the administration and 
Congress, it is expected that Washington will take a more offensive 
approach against China and that bilateral trade disputes will therefore rise 
dramatically. It is commonly suggested that a trade war may be prompted 
by the large U.S. trade deficit with China, which rose from less than USD 
7 billion in 1987 to USD 266 billion in 2008.21 The deficit has generated 
repercussions beyond the economic realm, including increasing resentment 
toward China that is manifesting in the form of “China bashing”.22 
Empirical studies confirm that the trade deficit contributed to a sharp rise 
in unfavorable news coverage about China in the U.S.23  
However, even those who perceive China as a threat can hardly ignore 
the increasing interdependence between the two nations. For the last 30 
years, U.S. exports to China have increased more than 300 times.24 
Current China-U.S. trade amounts to USD 387 billion, making China the 
United States’ second largest trading partner.25 China is now also the 
largest holder of U.S. treasury bonds and is further expected to be a prime 
purchaser of the new U.S. government debt issued to finance the financial 
rescue program. 26  These data demonstrate the depth of China-U.S. 
                                                 
17
 For example, China lowered tariffs on goods important to U.S. industries from 25% in 1997 to 
7% in 2006. UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE [USTR], U.S.-CHINA TRADE RELATIONS: 
ENTERING A NEW PHASE OF GREATER ACCOUNTABILITY AND ENFORCEMENT, TOP-TO-BOTTOM 
REVIEW 9 (2006) [hereinafter 2006 USTR REVIEW], available at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/ 
default/files/Top-to-Bottom%20Review%20FINAL.pdf (last visited Sept. 17, 2009). 
18
 U.S. exports to China arose from USD 3.8 billion in 1980 to USD 55.2 billion in 2006.  
19
 2006 USTR REVIEW, supra note 17, at 10. See also Overmyer, supra note 16 (discussing 
China’s implementation of WTO commitments). 
20
 See MORRISON, supra note 11, at 2. GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER ET AL., US-CHINA TRADE 
DISPUTES: RISING TIDE, RISING STAKES 8 (2006) (“The grace period is now over as U.S. 
manufacturers and labor unions scramble to file complaints.”). 
21
 U.S. Census Bureau, Trade in Goods (Imports, Exports and Trade Balance) with China, 
http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5700.html#2008 (last visited Sept. 17, 2009). 
22
 CARLOS D. RAMIREZ & RONG RONG, CHINA BASHING: DOES TRADE DRIVE THE “BAD” NEWS 
ABOUT CHINA IN THE U.S. 4 (2009). 
23
 Id. at 13. 
24
 MORRISON, supra note 11, at 1. 
25
 KERRY DUMBAUGH, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, CHINA-U.S. RELATIONS IN THE 110TH 
CONGRESS: ISSUES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY 18, Order Code RL 33877 (2009), 
available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33877.pdf (last visited Sept. 17, 2009). 
26
 Id. at 1. China holds U.S. Treasury securities totaling more than USD 1,200 billion in 2008. 




economic interdependence and the complexity of the two powers’ 
love-hate trade relationship. 
III. MONITORING SCHEMES AND NEGOTIATIONS 
It should be kept in mind that U.S. trade action against China can even 
incur Chinese retaliation and harm U.S. business interests, as aggressive 
U.S. measures will likely reinforce China’s protectionist camp, which 
includes domestic industries and the bureaucracy. Thus, trade matters may 
be elevated to sensitive political issues.  
Both Washington and Beijing realize that they have much to lose and 
little to gain from an outright trade war. Consequently, both governments 
have resorted to various means of resolving bilateral trade conflicts. 
Among these measures are monitoring schemes, including government 
reports on trade barriers required under domestic laws, and the Trade 
Policy Review Mechanism and the Transitional Review Mechanism 
undertaken under the auspices of the WTO. These monitoring schemes 
have increased interactions among trading partners and enhanced their 
mutual understanding of where their differences lie. The governments of 
China and the U.S. have also held high-level negotiations, such as the 
Strategic Economic Dialogue, in order to settle trade conflicts without 
resorting to WTO litigation, which would incur substantial expenses and 
time. To understand China-U.S. trade relations, these monitoring schemes 
and negotiations are as important as the WTO dispute settlement process. 
A. Government Reports on Trade Barriers 
U.S. trade policy toward China is based on a careful analysis 
conducted under a monitoring scheme administered by an inter-agency 
group. This inter-agency group, headed by the United States Trade 
Representative (USTR), consists of several U.S .government agencies in 
Washington and China. This group is responsible for the “top-to-bottom” 
review of the United States’ China policy and for providing 
recommendations on the trade strategy toward China. 27  Under the 
                                                                                                           
WAYNE M. MORRISON & MARC LABONTE, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, CHINA’S HOLDINGS OF 
U.S. SECURITIES: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S. ECONOMY 4, Order Code RL 34314 (2009), 
available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34314.pdf (last visited Sept. 17, 2009). 
27
 The inter-agency agency entitled “the Trade Policy Staff Committee Subcommittee on China 
WTO Compliance” includes the USTR, the Departments of Commerce, State, Agriculture, and 
Treasury. USTR, 2008 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON CHINA’S WTO COMPLIANCE 1 (2008), available 
at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/asset_upload_file192_15258.pdf [hereinafter 2008 USTR 
REPORT]; 2006 USTR REVIEW, supra note 16, at 21 (stating that the U.S. Department of State 
established a large economic section in the U.S. embassy in China to review China’s trade policy 
and related issues). 
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U.S.-China Relation Act of 2000, the USTR also submits to Congress 
annually a report on China’s WTO compliance.28 Based on the USTR’s 
own assessment, as well as written comments from industry groups and 
experts’ testimonies, this report thoroughly reviews China’s compliance 
with its WTO obligations, ranging from import/export regulations, 
agricultural policy, to intellectual property rights issues. In addition to 
these government-initiated efforts, private persons can also invoke Section 
301 of the 1974 Trade Act to investigate foreign unfair trade practices.29 
This mechanism strengthens U.S. public-private collaboration in dealing 
with China on trade issues.  
Similar to the USTR reports, China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOC) 
began issuing the Foreign Market Access Report in 2003.30 The purpose 
of this report is to assess trade barriers against Chinese businesses. For 
instance, the 2009 report examines trade measures imposed by 16 major 
trading partners, including the United States.31 It also emphasizes the 
importance of tackling foreign trade barriers because in 2008 alone, 
Chinese exports were subject to 93 trade remedy investigations in 21 
countries, and the total value of these exports amounted to USD 61.4 
billion.32 From 2009, the MOC’s Fair Trade Bureau of Import and Export 
also began compiling and publishing information on foreign trade 
barriers.33 Furthermore, in 2005, China enacted the Foreign Trade Barrier 
Investigation Rules, under which a private person is able to petition to the 
government to investigate foreign trade barriers.34 As China-U.S. trade 
frictions grow, it is expected that these mechanisms will be used with 
increasing frequency.  
B. The Trade Policy Review Mechanism 
                                                 
28
 Pub. L. No. 106-286, div. B, tit. IV, § 401, 22 U.S.C.A. § 6951, 114 Stat. 900 (Oct. 10, 2000). 
29
 An Introduction to Section 301, http://www.aflcio.org/issues/jobseconomy/globaleconomy/intro 
301.cfm (last visited Sept. 17, 2009). 
30 Kuo Pie Mao Yi Tou Tzu Huan Ching Pao Kao 2009 Fa Pu Ti Shih Wai Mao Han Tou Tzu Feng 
Hsien (Foreign Market Access Report 2009 Published – Remind Foreign Trade and Investment 
Risks), XINHUA NEWS, Apr. 23, 2009, http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2009-04/23/con 




 MINISTRY OF COMMERCE OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, KUO PIE MAO YI TOU TZU 
HUAN CHING PAO KAO 2009 [FOREIGN MARKET ACCESS REPORT 2009] 1, available at 
http://gpj.mofcom.gov.cn/accessory/200904/1240391651251.pdf (last visited Aug. 31, 2009). 
33
 Yan Luo, Engaging the Private Sector: EU-China Trade Disputes under the Shadow of WTO 
Law?, 13(6) EURO. L.J. 800, 808 (2007). 
34
 Tui Wai Mao Yi Pi Lei Tiao Cha Kuei Tse [Foreign Trade Barrier Investigation Rules] (2005), 
available at http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/iroftb414/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2009). As of 
now, only one Chinese company, Jiangsu Laver Association, filed a petition on behalf of its 
members challenging Japan’s import restriction on Chinese laver exports. Luo, supra note 33, at 
809. 




Both the USTR and MOC reports were originally initiated for 
transparency purposes. But, more importantly, today they send a signal to 
the country’s trading partners: “We are watching you.” Moreover, allowing 
private parties to play a role in governmental trade investigations 
reinforces public-private partnership against foreign trade barriers. In 
addition to these unilateral monitoring schemes, there are also multilateral 
monitoring mechanisms under the WTO. The most commonly known 
mechanism is the Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM), set forth in 
Annex 3 of the WTO Agreement. The purpose of the TPRM is to increase 
the transparency and international understanding of each member’s trade 
policies and practices.35 To this end, all WTO members are subject to 
periodic reviews under the TPRM. The frequency of such reviews depends 
on their share of world trade: the first four members are reviewed every 
two years, the next 16 every four years, and the remaining members every 
six years, with the exception being granted to the least-developed 
countries.36  
The WTO General Council, consisting of all members, convenes as 
the Trade Policy Review Body to conduct these reviews. The reviews are 
based on reports prepared by the member under review and by the WTO 
Secretariat’s Trade Policy Review Division. During the TRPM meeting, 
the member under review is required to respond orally and in writing to 
written questions that other members have submitted in advance. Other 
members may also make observations and comments during the meeting. 
All of the reports, along with the minutes of the meeting, are made 
available to the public.  
From 1995 to 2009, there have been 212 TPRM reviews.37 The 
TPRM exerts peer-pressure on members to improve their trade frameworks. 
For this reason, newly acceded WTO members often consider the TPRM 
meeting to be their first “exam” after accession. The United States has 
been reviewed six times from 1996 and China has been reviewed twice.38 
Both China and the U.S. have used this multilateral forum to submit 
questions to each other in order to seek further clarification on each other’s 
trade regimes. For instance, during China’s 2008 TPRM process, the U.S. 
alone proposed more than 120 questions to China.39 Such a large number 
of inquiries demonstrates Washington’s keen interest in understanding 
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 Trade Policy Review Mechanism art. A(i), Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing 
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 World Trade Organization [WTO], Trade Policy Reviews: The Reviews, http://www.wto.org/ 
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Chinese trade practices, many of which are still based on “internal 
guidelines” not available to the public.  
C. The Transitional Review Mechanism 
As the globe’s third largest trading country, China is subject to the 
TPRM review once every two years. China is also subject to annual 
reviews for 10 years after its accession to the WTO under the Transitional 
Review Mechanism (TRM). The legal basis for the TPM is Section 18 of 
China’s Protocol of Accession to the WTO. The TRM is considered to be a 
“WTO-plus” obligation, 40  which can be considered discriminatory 
because only China is subject to this mechanism. The U.S. insisted on the 
inclusion of this annual review requirement and explicitly stated that it was 
the “objective” of U.S. trade policy to do so.41 Based on the U.S. view, the 
TRM is a tradeoff for China’s WTO membership because at its accession, 
China lacked a market economy and was thus not yet ready to be admitted 
to the WTO.42 The TRM, therefore, serves as a unique “precautionary” 
device to ensure China’s compliance with its WTO commitments.43  
In addition to the frequency of review, there are two further aspects of 
the TRM that distinguish it from the TPRM. First, the review process is 
more comprehensive and entails two steps. In the first step, the information 
submitted by China, specified in Annex 1A of the Protocol, is reviewed by 
16 WTO subsidiary bodies.44 In the second step, the General Council 
reviews the reports made by these bodies and makes a recommendation.45  
Second, China’s obligations under the TRM are “enforceable” in the 
WTO dispute settlement system because the TRM is set forth in the 
Protocol, which itself forms “an integral part of the WTO agreement.”46 In 
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contrast, the TPRM is unenforceable, given that it is expressly excluded 
from the scope of the “covered agreements” specified in the Dispute 
Settlement Understanding (DSU).47 As the TRM is both enforceable and 
conducted more often than the TPRM, the US uses the TRM as a forum to 
gain more detailed and up-to-date information about Chinese trade 
measures which the U.S. intends to challenge. Therefore, the TRM serves 
a function similar to the “discovery” phase of civil litigation and thus 
information gathered during the TRM review facilitates subsequent 
consultation and litigation proceedings. For example, during China’s 2008 
TRM review, the U.S. submitted detailed questions to China about its 
“famous brand programs.”48 About two month later, the U.S. filed a 
complaint against China, contending that the programs involve 
WTO-inconsistent subsidies. 49  The TRM thus accords a litigation 
“advantage” to the U.S., whereas China bears a more onerous burden when 
investigating U.S. trade measures that it deems to be WTO-illegal.  
D. The Strategic Economic Dialogue 
The USTR and MOC reports, along with the TPRM and TRM, are 
primarily for transparency purposes in order to help China and the U.S. 
understand and assess each other’s trade barriers. Once the trade barriers 
have been identified, the two nations would then engage in discussions in 
an attempt to prevent possible frictions. China-U.S. bilateral dialogues at 
the “highest official level” were made possible in 2006, when U.S. 
President George W. Bush and Chinese President Hu Jintao decided to 
create the “Strategic Economic Dialogue” (SED).50 The purpose of the 
SED was to provide a forum to discuss “long-term strategic issues” related 
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to the economy.51  
From 2006 to 2008, five SED meetings took place and were chaired 
by the U.S. treasury secretary and a Chinese vice premier. 52  These 
cabinet-level meetings signify the ascent of bilateral trade to a “strategic” 
level for both nations. However, a fundamental question remains as to 
whether these meeting were simply “talk shops” or did achieve substantive 
results. Indeed, the SED meetings do possess the nature of “talk shops” 
because the two sides tend to use the forum to discuss rather “big” issues 
over which there are major differences. These issues include China’s 
market economy status in U.S. anti-dumping proceedings, currency 
reforms and protection of intellectual property rights (IPR). These issues 
are “ongoing”, meaning that both sides simply “agreed to continue to 
discuss” them.53 Nonetheless, consensus has been reached on certain 
fundamental issues, the most important among which is the opening of 
China’s financial market to U.S. businesses. For instance, U.S. banks are 
now allowed to issue Reminbi bank cards, and the New York Stock 
Exchange and NASDAQ are permitted to operate branches in China. 
Although these “achievements” do not represent a significant portion of 
those the U.S. requested, the U.S. did gain market access to China with 
lower costs in comparison to the expenses and time that litigation would 
incur.  
SED meetings serve to avoid a trade war between the U.S. and China 
and are more “efficient” for the U.S. to achieve its goals. First, SED 
meetings allow the U.S. administration to have a justified “excuse” to put 
on hold Congress’ “China bashing” demands. These demands, including 
intensive WTO litigation, would likely lead to a tit-for-tat retaliation from 
the Chinese side. The U.S. would ultimately be forced to expend more 
resources to deal with China. Second, through the SED meetings, the U.S. 
can handle relatively “soft” issues and reserve WTO litigation as a final 
resort to deal with “hardcore” issues. It should be noted that even if the 
U.S. defeats China in a WTO action, the litigation and implementation 
process could take years. Thus, it is far more economical to resolve 
potential disputes through talks and induce Beijing to implement its 
promises in good faith.  
Turning to the Chinese side, while some may question how much 
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China actually has gained from SED meetings, the talks do allow Beijing 
to more accurately weigh the political risks and costs of not opening its 
market. China views its trade relationship with the U.S. as a politically 
sensitive one. The Chinese leadership does not want to appear to “succumb 
to” U.S. requests after losing in the WTO dispute settlement process. In 
their view, defeat in a WTO legal battle would cause the government to 
“lose face” and may even incur strong criticism from the Chinese 
population, as it would remind them of the nation’s subordinate 
international status in the past. SED meetings, on the contrary, accord 
China “big state status” on par with the U.S. and illustrate the opening up 
of the domestic market as mutually beneficial. Consequently, bilateral talks, 
in particular the SED meetings, play an important role in preventing the 
U.S. and China from sliding into a full-scale trade war.  
IV. WTO DISPUTES 
If efforts through the monitoring schemes and dialogues fail to achieve 
what Washington or Beijing expected, either government may resort to the 
WTO dispute settlement mechanism. The U.S. administration has carefully 
assessed its litigation strategy against China from several angles. First, 
litigation against China may cause a backlash, as the Chinese leadership 
may see the U.S. move as an insult or an “act of bad faith”.54 The matter 
may be seen as a political rather than trade issues and may unite Chinese 
groups in a protectionist font to the detriment of American exporters. 
Second, WTO litigation may also harm U.S. domestic industries because 
they will inevitably incur higher costs to purchase Chinese raw materials, 
such as steel, if the WTO finds Chinese imports to be WTO-illegal. In the 
end, U.S. consumers may spend more on consumer products.  
For these external and domestic considerations, the U.S. government 
prefers to resolve trade disputes with China through bilateral talks, and has 
been reluctant to take a harsh stance on China. For instance, the Bush 
administration once declined a Section 301 petition asking the government 
to launch a WTO case against China’s currency policy.55 As for China, 
due to the reasons provided in the last section, the government also prefers 
bilateral talks to litigation. Consequently, since China joined the WTO, it 
has mostly been on the defensive side of WTO litigations. In the following 
sections, I will explore how the two countries’ litigation strategies have 
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changed and argue that the proliferation of trade disputes in fact 
strengthens bilateral economic ties by legalizing rather than “politicizing” 
trade frictions.  
A. The United States as the Complainant 
The U.S. government understood the importance of bilateral dialogues, 
but it also recognized that the threat of litigation might coax China back to 
the negotiating table. Hence, the strategy was not to “win” the case in the 
legal battlefield but to force China to yield to U.S. requests before 
litigation. This strategy worked in the initial years when China was not yet 
familiar with the WTO legal system and was inclined to settle cases 
brought against it. However, the strategy of using litigation as a 
“supplement to negotiations” changed, to some extent, in the second term 
of the Bush administration (2005-2009). The prime reason was that the 
Democratic Congress passed various bills to take a tougher stance on 
China, including one on the use of “WTO litigation as a sanction.”56 As 
the fast-track Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) ended in June 2007, the 
Bush administration needed to respond to these congressional demands in 
order to receive an extension of the TPA. For this reason, the WTO cases 
the U.S. brought against China increased in recent years.  
1. Settled Cases. — The United States has brought seven 
complaints against China, including one case in 2004, one in 2006, three in 
2007 and two in 2008.57 These cases primarily concerned three categories: 
China’s prohibited subsidies, industrial policies and IPR protection. Of the 
seven cases, the U.S. and China settled three.58 In 2004, the U.S. brought 
the first case, China – Value-added Tax on Integrated Circuits, against 
China.59 In this case, the U.S. alleged that China allowed for a partial 
refund of value-added tax (VAT) for domestically produced integrated 
circuits (ICs) and ICs that are designed in China and manufactured 
abroad.60 For instance, while U.S. ICs were subject to a 17% VAT, causing 
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a loss of USD 344 million, China-made ICs were subject to only 3% VAT 
due to the refund.61 The U.S. argued that China’s rebate policy constituted 
discrimination against imported ICs in violation of WTO rules, including 
Articles I and III of the GATT 1994.62 This was the first WTO case 
against China by a WTO member. China and the U.S. held consultation on 
this matter and decided to settle the case by signing the Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) in July 2004.63 According to the MOU, China 
agreed to stop providing refunds for China-made ICs. In 2005, both 
countries notified the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) that China 
“successfully implemented” the mutual agreement.64 This case is a prime 
example of how litigation could coax China back to the negotiating table. 
The U.S. had attempted to negotiate with China regarding the IC policy, 
but the effort failed. Yet, after the U.S. filed the case with the WTO, the 
two sides reached an agreement in only four months.  
In 2007, China also settled in China-Prohibited Subsidies, which was 
brought by the U.S.65 In that case, Washington contended that Beijing’s 
tax regulations and government circulars, which provided domestic 
enterprises with export and import substitution subsidies, violated various 
WTO agreements, including Article 3 of the Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement).66 On the one hand, the U.S. 
requested the establishment of a WTO panel and, on the other hand, 
continued to engage in consultations with China.67 Just four months after 
DSB established a panel for the case, China agreed to repeal all 
WTO-inconsistent measures.68  
                                                                                                           
information on this case, refer to Gao, supra note 4, at 374-80. 
61
 Press Release, USTR, U.S. Files WTO Case Against China over Discriminatory Taxes that Hurt 
U.S. Exports (Mar. 18, 2004), available at http://www.us-mission.ch/press2004/0318ChinaWTO.h 
tm (last visited Sept. 18. 2009). 
62
 See Request for Consultations by the United States, supra note 59, at 2 (stating that in the 
U.S.’s view, China violated “Articles I and III of the GATT 1994, the Protocol on the Accession of 
the People’s Republic of China (WT/L/432), and Article XVII of the GATS”). 
63
 See generally Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution, China – Value-added Tax on 




 Request for Consultations by the United States, China – Certain Measures Granting Refunds, 
Reductions or Exemptions from Taxes and Other Payments, at 1, WT/DS358/1, G/L/813, 
G/SCM/D74/1, G/TRIMS/D/25 (Feb. 7, 2007). 
66
 Id. at 3. Subsidies were provided on the conditions that the enterprises purchased domestic over 
imported goods or meet certain export performance criteria. 
67
 The consultations were held in March and June 2007, respectively. The DSB deferred the 
establishment of the panel in July and established the panel in the following meeting in August. 
WTO, Dispute Settlement: Dispute DS358, China – Certain Measures Granting Refunds, 
Reductions or Exemptions from Taxes and Other Payments, http://www.wto.org/eng 
lish/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds358_e.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2009); Communication from 
China and the United States, China – Certain Measures Granting Refunds, Reductions or 
Exemptions from Taxes and Other Payments, at 2, WT/DS358/14 (Jan. 4, 2008) [hereinafter 
Communication from China and the United States]. 
68
 Communication from China and the United States, supra note 67, at 4. 
386 AJWH [VOL. 4:369 
 
In 2008, China and the U.S. settled another case, China – Measures 
Affecting Financial Information Services and Foreign Financial 
Information Supplies. 69  Here, the U.S. challenged China’s regulatory 
regime that required foreign financial information suppliers, such as Dow 
Jones and Bloomberg, to operate through the state-owned Xinhua News 
Agency.70 Foreign financial information suppliers were also required to 
submit confidential information about their services and customers to the 
Chinese government and were prohibited from establishing commercial 
presence in China.71 The U.S. alleged that China’s regime violated several 
WTO provisions, including Articles XVI, XVII and XVII of the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).72 In December 2008, both 
governments decided to settle the case by signing an MOU in which China 
committed to amend the regime.73  
In these three cases, China conceded to U.S. requests in no more than 
10 months after the U.S. officially initiated legal action. Several reasons 
may have contributed to settlement of these cases. First, the Chinese 
government was concerned about its lack of expertise to deal with WTO 
disputes. This concern was particularly reasonable, given that the 
complainant, the United States, possesses substantial experience in WTO 
litigation. Second, many of the Chinese measures that the U.S. challenged 
had been in effect for a few years. After weighing the benefits that Chinese 
companies had gained and the expenses that may be incurred in defending 
these disputes in the WTO, Beijing decided to settle these cases. From the 
U.S. perspective, these cases indicate that the threat of litigation may be 
“helpful” to deal with trade disputes with China.   
2. Prevailing Cases. — Two cases brought by the U.S. against 
China actually went beyond the consultation stage and were eventually 
won by the U.S. The first case was China-Auto Parts, which the U.S. filed 
in 2006. The U.S. alleged that the tariff that China imposed on imported 
auto parts constituted discrimination in violation of several WTO 
provisions.74 In general, China charged a 10% tariff on auto parts. Yet, 
imported auto parts were subject to a 25% tariff if they were “characterized 
as complete vehicles” – meaning that such auto parts constitute 60% or 
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more of the value of a complete automobile.75 The practical effects of the 
regulations were twofold. First, domestic auto industries would prefer to 
use local auto parts because imported ones incurred higher costs. Moreover, 
foreign auto companies would move their manufacturing bases to China in 
order to avoid the 25% tariff. The shift of US auto parts factories to China 
would in turn increased unemployment in the U.S. China-Auto Parts was 
the first case against China to reach the panel stage and was so far the only 
case in which China appealed to the Appellate Body. 
The Appellate Body issued its report in December 2008 and agreed 
with the panel on most of the issues, finding that China’s measures, which 
constituted “an internal charge”, violated the national treatment 
requirements under Articles III:2 and III:4 of the GATT 1994.76 Following 
the Appellate Body’s decision, China indicated that it would revise the 
WTO-inconsistent regulations by September 2009.77 However, it would be 
premature to simply conclude that this case was China’s “first defeat” in 
WTO tribunals,78 given that the case has several salient implications. To 
begin with, the change in the alleged regulations may not actually have a 
significant impact on foreign auto industries because China’s auto 
regulations, which were implemented in 2004, have already achieved their 
purpose of enhancing local auto part industries. Even foreign auto 
companies, such as BMW and Mercedes-Benz, have indicated that their 
vehicles sold in China would achieve 40% or more of the “localized rate” 
and that they would decrease the volume of imported auto parts.79 More 
importantly, from the perspective of China’s WTO capacity building, the 
country, for the first time, went through all stages of WTO litigation and 
thereby gained first-hand litigation experience.80 While the immediate 
result of the case may not be satisfactory to Beijing, the experience that it 
gained may well turn out to be a profitable one in the future.  
In 2007, the U.S. initiated another complaint, China-IPR, against 
China.81 Washington had been deeply concerned about IPR issues in 
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China, given that U.S. businesses suffered enormous losses in the Chinese 
market due to the lack of sufficient IPR protection. The U.S. government 
listed China on the Section 301 Priority Watch List and IPR issues 
maintained a high priority on the agenda of bilateral dialogues. Despite 
Beijing’s “positive efforts” to improve IPR protection, Washington decided 
to bring action against China in the WTO as a final resort to bring further 
changes to China’s legal framework.82  
In 2008, the panel issued its report, finding in favor of the U.S. on 
most claims. The panel held that Chinese copyright law’s exclusion of 
works that are prohibited by Chinese law from protection works that are 
prohibited by Chinese law violated Article 41.1 of the Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). The panel 
explained that censorship cannot eliminate copyright entirely. Additionally, 
the panel found China’s customs regulations to be inconsistent with Article 
46 because Chinese regulations allowed confiscated goods to be auctioned 
after their infringing features have been removed.  
Nonetheless, the panel did not rule in favor of the U.S. challenge to 
Chinese law’s high threshold for criminal prosecution of copyright 
infringement. Although Article 61 of the TRIPS requires WTO members to 
criminalize “willful trademark counterfeiting or copyright piracy on a 
commercial scale, the panel found that the U.S. did not provide sufficient 
evidence to establish quantitative thresholds for a “commercial scale.” 
Thus, even though the panel found in favor of the U.S. on most issues, the 
U.S. did not prevail on its Article 61 claim, which was presumably the 
most important claim from the perspective of U.S. businesses. At the end 
of the proceedings, China did not appeal the case. The two governments 
are now determining the reasonable period of time for China to implement 
the panel’s decision.83 The panel’s mixed ruling on this case shows China 
that it is actually capable of defending its legal regime under the WTO and, 
in the long term, may make China more inclined to accept the rulings of 
the panel. 
3. Ongoing Cases. — Currently, there are two pending WTO 
cases that the U.S. filed against China. The first concerns China’s 
restriction on trading rights and distribution services for certain U.S. 
publications and audiovisual products, and the second relates to China’s 
alleged subsidies to domestic enterprises under the “famous brand 
programs.”84 A panel is expected to issue a report on the former case in 
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2009, whereas the latter case is still under consultation.  
Based on the seven cases filed by the U.S. against China, the U.S. 
strategy has largely been successful – either China settled or the U.S. 
obtained a favorable decision. These cases also exemplify how the 
legalized framework of the WTO can prevent the peril of a trade war. This 
conclusion can be further buttressed by China’s reaction to these litigations. 
Instead of seeing them as a political matter as in the early days, China has 
gradually come to consider WTO litigation to be a technical matter and has 
begun to make confident legal arguments to defend its interests in recent 
cases.  
B. China as the Complainant 
The cases discussed above seem to suggest that China has been 
exclusively on the defensive side of WTO litigations. This may have been 
true in the initial years after China joined the WTO when China was 
hesitant to file complainants in the WTO. From 2001 to 2009, 14 cases 
were brought by various WTO members, including seven brought by the 
U.S.85  Even as China was busy handling these cases, Chinese trade 
officials were well aware that the nation needed to enhance its WTO 
litigation capacity.  
To this end, China has actively participated in WTO proceedings. As 
of April 2009, China has participated as a third party in 62 cases.86 For 
these cases, China’s Ministry of Commerce routinely selected 
Beijing-based law firms through a bidding process and engaged them to 
research legal issues and draft third party submissions. As a general 
practice, an official in the Ministry would be “paired with” private lawyers 
and work on a particular WTO case together. The Chinese government 
sees these cases as training opportunities to develop “its own” trade 
lawyers. This explains why China did not join the Advisory Centre on 
WTO Law (ACWL), an international organization aimed at providing legal 
service for less-developed countries.87 It should be noted that although the 
ACWL may help a government to handle a WTO case, it does not 
necessarily enhance the member’s overall litigation capacity. In addition to 
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the involvement of private law firms, China has also set up various WTO 
research centers in Shanghai and Beijing to further the country’s WTO 
understanding. 88  Although these centers are primarily funded by 
municipal governments, they also receive grants from the central 
government for WTO-related research projects.  
China has gradually learned how to actively assert its rights in the 
WTO. The country has initiated four cases, all of which were aimed at the 
U.S. In 2002, China brought its very first case, US-Steel Safeguards, 
challenging the procedural flaws of U.S. safeguard measures imposed on 
imported steel products. The Appellate Body issued its report in 2003, 
finding that the U.S. measures violated the procedural requirements under 
the Safeguards Agreement. Some may suggest that this was China’s first 
success in WTO litigation and signifies a fundamental change in China’s 
litigation strategy. However, this would be a premature conclusion. It should 
be noted that China officially joined the WTO only in December 2001, and 
that this case was filed only four months after China’s accession. Thus, 
China’s filing of this case was presumably due to the strong partnership 
among the eight co-complainants, which included frequent WTO litigation 
users such as the European Communities, Japan and Korea.89 Subsequent 
history also suggests that US-Steel Safeguards did not represent a shift in 
China’s WTO litigation strategy because after the case, the country did not 
file a second case until 2007.  
The second case, along with the third filed in 2008, challenged U.S. 
procedures on assessing anti-dumping and countervailing duties and finally 
revealed a change in China’s attitude toward asserting its right under the 
WTO.90 The most recent case that China initiated against the U.S. is 
US-Poultry Ban, filed in April 2009. In that case, China found Section 727 
of the U.S. Omnibus Appropriation Act of 2009 to be “clearly 
discriminatory” because it bans poultry imports from China.91 While the 
U.S. alleged that its ban was due to sanitary reasons, China considered the 
measure to be “protectionist” and cannot be justified under the Agreement 
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on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement).92 Interestingly, 
China’s position was supported by certain U.S. industrial groups, 
particularly the National Chicken Council, which argues that the U.S. ban 
should have been based on scientific evidence.93 
What do these China-initiated cases tell us? The WTO dispute 
settlement mechanism is the first and only state-to-state “international court” 
under which China has consented to mandatory jurisdiction. China’s 
accession to the WTO thus represents its first move in being integrated into 
the international legal order. Since 2007, instead of “observing” the WTO 
cases as a third party as it did in the earlier years, China has actively asserted 
its rights in the system. Recent litigations saw China making arguments 
based on WTO rather than radical remarks. While the term “aggressive 
legalism” has been used to depict the behavior of some East Asian countries 
in dealing with WTO disputes,94 a more accurate phrase to describe China’s 
evolving trade litigation strategy should be “assertive legalism.” The reason 
is that China’s litigation strategy is not yet “aggressive”, but protects its 
legitimate trade interests under the WTO system. It is also noteworthy that 
the United States’ reaction to China’s assertive legalism has been positive, as 
Washington considers that it is “normal and constructive” for the two trading 
partners to solve trade disputes in the WTO.95 This benign interaction 
between the U.S. and China also supports my argument that China-U.S. 
trade frictions can be resolved under the WTO legal framework, so as to 
avoid a trade war sparked by misguided unilateral measures.  
V. CONCLUSION 
Due to China’s rising economic power, its trade relations with the 
United States are of great importance to the global economic order. While it 
has been suggested that the two countries’ increasing trade frictions may 
lead to a tit-for-tat trade war and thus damage bilateral economic ties, this 
article disagrees with such a proposition. As the article explains, both 
Beijing and Washington are well aware that unilateral trade measures may 
lead to retaliatory actions from the other side and therefore have attempted to 
resolve their differences via monitoring mechanisms and high-level bilateral 
dialogues. Moreover, the article provides an overview of the WTO disputes 
between China and the U.S. and demonstrates a positive development of 
bilateral interactions within the WTO framework. Even in cases in which the 
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U.S. had prevailed, China has agreed to implement the WTO decisions 
rather than challenge the legitimacy of the WTO dispute settlement process. 
The recent cases also show that China has changed its litigation strategy and 
is more inclined to assert its trade interests in the WTO. These efforts not 
only further integrate China into the international economic order, but also 
pave the way for the future positive development of China-U.S trade 
relations.  
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